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The main aim of post-Soviet agrarian reforms was to replace Soviet collective farms with much 
smaller family-based structures characteristic of agricultural production in the West. The rationale 
for the reforms was based on the belief in the superiority of private over public ownership of 
businesses, and that the downsizing of Russian farms would make them more efficient. However, 
twenty years later Russian agricultural production is dominated by large corporate agricultural 
businesses, which incorporate in their structure dozens of former collective farms. Why have 
the market reforms resulted in the rise of agroholdings, and are agroholdings here to stay? This 
paper addresses these questions by putting the development of Russian agroholdings into the 
wider context of the increase in farm sizes worldwide, and by presenting evidence from two case 
studies, both located in the Black Earth region, and by focusing on their economies of scale and 
scope. We conclude that these businesses currently incur significant diseconomies of scale but 
which are compensated for by economies of scope. We find that the most serious diseconomies of 
scale are related to labour management and that the technological solutions to these problems 
favoured by agroholdings risk aggravating the already acute problem of rural unemployment. 
The future development of business-related institutions and markets will directly affect economies 
of scope and therefore influence the life-span of very large farms.
1 We would like to thank Olga Fadeeva from the Department of Social Problems, Institute of Economics and Industrial 
Engineering, Novosibirsk, for her assistance in the fieldwork for this research, and the employees of the two case study 
farms for their time and contributions.
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Introduction: aims and results of Russian agrarian reforms
Prior to the market reforms of agriculture there were two major agricultural production 
sectors in Russia: large collective farms (kolkhoz, sovkhoz) and individual household 
plots (lichnoe podsobnoe khozyastvo). Collective farms were deemed inherently 
inefficient because of their organisational form and size. Both organisational forms—
whether a production cooperative or a state enterprise—suffered from moral hazard, 
shirking and free-riding. The size—8,500 ha of farmland and 420 employees on 
average in 1980s2—was considered too large to be efficiently manageable under market 
conditions [Lerman 2001, p. 10]. Following the reforms most collective farms changed 
their legal status (some more than once) into one of the new legal forms permitted by the 
reforms: state enterprises, municipal enterprises, joint stock companies, limited liability 
companies, commandite societies, and agricultural production cooperatives [Uzun, 
Saraikin, Gataulina, Shagaida, Yanbykh, Mary, Gomez y Paloma 2014]. Hereafter we 
will call this sector “corporate farms”. 
The reforms introduced a third category of farm, the Peasant (Farmer) Operator 
(krestyanskoe (fermerskoe) khozyastvo). This category is close to the family farm as it 
is understood in the West, and for that reason we will call these “family farms” rather 
than “peasant farms”3. It was this third sector that the policy makers hoped would be 
increasingly responsible for producing agricultural output, taking agricultural resources 
primarily from corporate farms. However, the sector was slow to establish itself, 
handicapped by the harsh macro-economic climate at the time, by the uncertainties 
surrounding the switch from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and 
by the way the assets of collective farms were distributed. Indeed, only 5% of rural 
residents withdrew shares to set up their own farm businesses, the majority preferred to 
leave their shares with the corporate farm and carry on with their own household plots 
[Uzun, Saraikin, Gataulina, Shagaida, Yanbykh, Mary, Gomez y Paloma 2014, p. 47].
The gross share of agricultural output from these three sectors between 1990 and 
2012 is shown in Table 1. Family farms produced only 3.2% of all agricultural output in 
2000, although this share continued to grow and by 2012 reached 8.9%.
The most recent data available on farm structures is for 2006. Table 2 is based 
on [Uzun 2010]. Uzun calculated standardised revenue from one item of livestock 
and one hectare of land and used these standards to estimate the value of agricultural 
production of each agricultural producer (hereafter unit) in the 2006 census. The census 
units were grouped according to the size of their standardised revenue (SR), taking an 
annual revenue of 30,000 roubles as the threshold for a commercial farm (tovarnoe 
khozyastvo). Across the Russian Federation only about 11% of registered units produced 
sufficient output to be classified as any kind of commercial farm, the remaining 89% 
2 Fomin gives smaller figures, according to him, the average size of collective enterprises was 4000–5000 ha of land and 
200–300 employees with some regional variations [Fomin 2013, p. 92].
3  As Russian statisticians group peasant (farmer) operators with individual entrepreneurs (individualny predprini-
matel), the category “family farms” in this paper also includes the later.
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were subsistence producers (at best). Within this 11% the bulk of the production took 
place on large (SR 3 million to 30 million roubles) and very large (SR over 30 million 
roubles) commercial farms. Furthermore, very large commercial farms (i.e. with an 
estimated value of production over 30 million roubles), 98% of which were corporate 
farms and only 2% family farms, amounted to a mere 0.01% of the total number of the 
census units, but managed 37% of sown land, 25.4% of all cattle, 39.5% of all pigs and 
60.9% of all poultry. 
Table 1. Gross agricultural production by type of farm (in current prices, % of total output)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012
All farms 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
including:
Corporate farms 73,7 50,2 45,2 44,6 44,5 47,2 47,9
Household plots 26,3 47,9 51,6 49,3 48,3 43,8 43,2
Family farms [Inc. individual 
entrepreneurs] 0 1,9 3,2 6,1 7,2 9,0 8,9
Source: [Goskomstat 2013].
These data show a far greater concentration of agricultural production than is evident 
from the output figures reported in Table 1. Another census result, highlighted in [Uzun 
2010], is that 299,000 registered agricultural producers produced no output whatsoever. 
These farms existed only on paper but controlled 38.2 million ha of farmland, suggesting 
great scope for further restructuring of the agricultural sector.
Among large-scale corporate farms, which now evidently dominate agricultural 
production in Russia, agroholdings are of particular interest because they are a direct 
product of the market reforms. Increasingly present since the late 1990s, agroholdings 
are characterised by their exceptionally large size, the dominance of non-agricultural 
investors, and a vertically and/or horizontally integrated business structure. Official 
Russian statistics do not provide separate information about their number, structure, 
or output, the only comprehensive quantitative analysis of their contribution into 
agricultural production is found in [Uzun (2) 2012]. He shows that by 2006 agroholdings 
had already encompassed 21% of all large and middle-size corporate farms and were 
producing 26.5% of marketed agricultural output [Uzun (2) 2012, p. 136]. The largest 
hundred agroholdings in Russia farmed in excess of 5 million ha of farmland, managing 
an average of at least 100,000 ha each [Uzun (2) 2012, p. 139].
Agroholdings differ significantly in their profitability. In 2006 farms belonging 
to agroholdings established by foreign individuals or foreign companies reported 
a profitability of 26% (profit as percentage of costs), which was more than twice the 
average for all large and average size corporate farms in Russia; farms controlled 
by Russian private (non-government) agroholdings reported 14.4% profitability, 
while farms of government-owned agroholdings averaged minus 4%, and farms of 
municipal agroholdings reported profitability of minus 12.5% [Uzun (2) 2012, p. 137]. 
The wide gap between private and state agroholdings is probably due to a difference 
in priorities, with business investors seeking a return on capital and local authorities 
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promoting agroholdings as a way to continue production from the assets of heavily 
indebted corporate farms and as a way to maintain rural employment [Rylko, Jolly 2005; 
Hockmann, Bokusheva, Bezlepkina 2007; Fadeeva 2009].
Тable 2. Structure of agricultural production (as estimated by Uzun (2010) based on 2006 

























All farms 36944.3 89.2 10.5 0.2 0.1 0.013
Corporate farms 59.2 21.97 15.0 28.0 27.3 7.9
Family farms 285.1 62.3 21.1 14.8 1.8 0.03
Household plots (1) 22800 83.22 16.59 0.13 0 0
Household plots (2) 13800 99.8 0.07 0 0 0
Land, ha 450660 10.6 3.8 19.0 36.5 30.0
Sown area, ha 74766 2.7 3.3 12.6 44.7 36.8
Grain &
legumes 43647 0.2 2.3 14.3 45.4 37.7
Industrial crops 8812 0.1 2.5 17.4 43.0 37.0
Potatoes 2120 59.7 29.5 3.0 4.3 3.5
Vegetables 743 47.4 23.1 10.5 10.1 8.9
Fodder 19444 1.3 2.2 7.8 49.4 39.2
Livestock
Cattle 23509 5.3 41.0 5.4 22.9 25.4
Pigs 17094 8.2 39.8 4.9 7.6 39.5
Sheep and goats 22478 11.7 40.6 26.8 12.6 8.4
Poultry 391258 15.3 21.2 0.7 1.9 60.9
Household plots (1) – individual household plots. Household plots (2) – household plots in non-
commercial associations (dachas, summer cottages etc.).
More than 20 years after the start of the market reforms in Russia it is natural to 
ask why they have produced such surprising results. The concentration of production 
and resources among relatively few massive farms is clearly not what the reformers 
envisaged, nor is the ownership structure described above. The reformers believed that, 
after privatisation of the assets of collective farms, a family-based private farming sector 
would rapidly develop, but instead agricultural production is dominated by very large 
corporate farm businesses which have incorporated many former collective farms into 
their structure. Why, despite the conventional wisdom that family farms suit agriculture 
best under market conditions, have agroholdings succeeded in Russia?
The answers suggested in literature include: (1) the cultural determinants of 
behaviour, formed during tsarist and communist times, which inhibit individualisation 
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in agriculture [Koester 2005; Petrick 2007]; (2) a bias towards integration induced 
by local authorities [Hockmann, Bokusheva, Bezlepkina 2007]; and (3) land grabbing 
[Visser, Mamonova, Spoor 2012]. To address this question we, firstly, place Russian 
agroholdings into a wider context—the rise of large farms worldwide (section 2). 
In section 3 we examine two counteracting economic forces which underpin the observed 
trends towards larger farms. In section 4 we present evidence from two case studies 
of agroholdings in Russia, focusing on their strengths and weaknesses. The conclusion 
considers the future of agroholdings in Russia.
The global push for large-scale farms
Russia is not unique with regard to the development of agroholdings. Historically, large 
operations were dominant in plantation crops, but for most temperate crops the backbone 
of agricultural production were relatively small family-owned farms. However, a review of 
recent evidence on the rise of large farms across the globe by Deininger and Byerlee shows 
that over the last two decades many land abundant countries have seen growing investment 
in large-scale farming based on a non-family corporate model, a trend often accompanied 
by a growing concentration of land ownership. Typically, large operational units of 
10,000 ha or more are horizontally integrated into corporations which control hundreds 
of thousands of hectares, vertical integration involving shared processing, marketing, and 
export logistics is also common. The recent interest of institutional investors in agriculture, 
in response to the 2007–2008 global food crisis, has reinforced this trend. The authors 
stress that the environmental, social and productivity impacts of large-scale farming vary 
widely from country to country [Deininger, Byerlee 2011, pp. 701–702].
In Eastern Europe and Central Asia the outcomes of the transition from the 
soviet system to new agrarian structures have been determined by countries’ factor 
endowment, institutional structure, infrastructure, the share of agriculture in the overall 
labour force, and the ways the reforms were implemented. In land abundant countries 
where collective farms were divided into small plots allocated to members, the plots 
were quickly rented back by companies with access to finance and machinery, and as 
a result, capital-intensive corporate farming is now dominant. In Russia, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan—the region’s most land abundant countries—the level of concentration 
is the highest. In Russia the 30 largest holdings farm 6.7 million ha or 5.5% of the 
cultivated area, in Ukraine the largest 40 control 4.5 million ha or 13.6% of the 
cultivated area [Deininger, Byerlee 2011, p. 703].
Structural changes in the USA
At present, most large operations occur in land abundant regions4 and there is little 
evidence of significant recent changes in farm structures in land scarce countries 
[Deininger, Byerlee 2011, p. 702]. However, a recent report on farm businesses in USA 
4 Namely, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa.
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shows a clear trend towards larger farms. The USA is a land abundant country, but unlike 
the countries considered by Deininger and Byerlee, it has a highly developed market 
economy, which makes it an interesting case for comparison.
MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe5 reported the size of arable farms in the USA doubled 
between 1982 and 2007. As recently as the early 1980s most cropland was operated by 
farms of less than 600 acres (242 ha), today most cropland is on farms with at least 1,100 
acres (442 ha) and many are 5 and 10 times that size. These larger farms now dominate 
crop production  [MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe 2013, p. 1]. Changes in the size of livestock 
enterprises were even greater. In 1987 the midpoint6 dairy herd size was 80 cows, by 
2007 it had increased to 570. The midpoint of pig farms increased from 1,200 to 30,000 
over the same period [MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe 2013, p. 15]. Interestingly, the number 
of small farms7 has also increased since 2000. This reverse in the long-term steady 
decline in their numbers is due to recent agricultural support programmes and increasing 
demand for locally grown food. However, many small farms are managed and staffed on 
a part-time basis, allowing owners of the business to support farm income with off-farm 
employment, pensions and savings. As such, they reflect a deliberate lifestyle choice. 
The net result of these changes is a “hollowing out” of the middle size farms.
These long-term shifts in farm size have been accompanied by a move towards 
greater specialization. Beginning with the separation of livestock from crop farming 
in the latter half of the 20th century, the consolidation of production has accelerated. In 
2007 22% of crop production occurred on farms that grew only a single crop and another 
30% on farms with two crops. Only 11% occurred on farms with five or more crops 
[MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe 2013, Table 13, p. 34]. This concentration was particularly 
clear in corn and soybean production, 40% of which was on farms with only two crops 
[MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe 2013, p. 34 ].
A key driver of these structural changes has been new technologies, in particular, 
labour saving innovations, bigger and faster capital equipment, improved information 
technology, chemical herbicides, seed genetics, and changing tillage techniques. 
Replacing labour with machines eases managerial supervisory constraints, allowing 
fewer farmers to manage more hectares of land. The pattern of agricultural employment 
has also been affected. Increased specialisation amplified seasonal fluctuations in demand 
for labour. Whilst demand for labour has increased during peak periods, for longer 
periods there is insufficient work to justify employing full-time workers. Consequently, 
full-time employment on farms has fallen, being replaced by a larger part-time (often 
self-employed) workforce, contracted to work during peak periods.
These increases in size and specialization mean that farms have become riskier 
businesses. Their massive projects and invested assets are exposed to adverse movements 
in commodity prices, unpredictable weather, and diseases. Although large corporations are 
better equipped to handle technical challenges, they have increasingly turned to production 
5 MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe used the Census of Agriculture and confidential farm-level data to generate measures of 
consolidation and changes in farm size for the US between 1982 and 2007.
6 Midpoint acreage/dairy herd size is defined as the point at the farm size/herd distribution graph at which half the 
cropland acres/dairy cows are on farms with more cropland/cows that the midpoint and half on farms with less. It is an 
especially useful measure for size distributions that are highly skewed.
7 Defined as “place that produces or which could normally produce $1,000 worth of agricultural commodities in a year”. 
The reported increase in their numbers also reflects a statistical phenomenon. The value of agricultural commodities sold 
has not been adjusted for inflation. If it had been, the value would have increased to $2,720/year (172% increase in Pro-
ducer Price Index between 1974 and 2011) [MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe 2013, p. 6].
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and marketing contracts to help manage the price and marketing risk. In USA, contracts, 
which are predominately used by larger farms, covered 32% of crop production in 2011, 
compared with 23% in the mid-1990s [MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe 2013, p. ii].
Farming is a heavily regulated sector, and government policies are likely to affect 
farm structure. American commodity support programmes and direct, area-related, 
payment schemes favour larger farms, and their crop insurance schemes favour increasing 
specialisation, though as MacDonald, Korb, and Hoppe warn, the effects occur through 
multiple channels and can be difficult to analyse.
MacDonald, Korb, and Hoppe conclude that as larger crop farms and larger 
livestock farms realize better financial returns by making more intensive use of their 
labour and capital, this “trend is likely to continue” [MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe 2013, 
p. i]. Despite the increased specialisation of production and the increase in farm size, 
the ownership structure of the US farming sector has not changed. In 2011, 96% of 
USA crop farms were owned by families8 and accounted for 87% of the value of crop 
production [MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe 2013, p. 47]. However, the very largest crop and 
livestock farms are not now owned and operated by families [MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe 
2013, p. 46]. In the next section we will look in more detail at the economic forces which 
come into play in very large farm businesses.
Economies of scale and economies  
of scope—the driving forces towards larger farms
As farms grow, they gain internal economies of scale, that is, they benefit from a fall in the 
unit cost of production as output increases. However, a peculiarity of farming is that beyond 
a certain size internal economies of scale cease and turn into diseconomies. This is due to 
the high internal transaction costs associated with maintaining managerial control, which 
is vital, given the importance of many on-the-spot decisions when the working environment 
is directly exposed to the elements [Allen, Lueck 1998]. Whilst internal diseconomies of 
scale for agricultural businesses are believed to start at a relatively modest size, external 
economies of scale might continue to grow with size. For example, a farm business may be 
able to gain a dominant position in production of a specific commodity. The balance between 
internal and external economies of scale is likely to be different for each farm business.
Large businesses may also benefit from economies of scope9. Like economies of 
scale, economies of scope refer to the lowering of average unit costs. These occur when: 
(i) opportunities exist for cross-selling products, (ii) when inputs of one enterprise can 
be used in other enterprises (e.g. managerial skills, technical know-how and equipment); 
(iii) inputs are used at different times of the year; and (iv) outputs of one enterprise are 
inputs to another enterprise. The fact that very few land-based farms have traditionally 
focused exclusively on one enterprise strongly suggests that economies of scope exist 
in agriculture [Schmitt 1991].
8 Family farms are defined as “one in which the principal operator, and people related to the principal operator by blood 
or marriage, own more than half of the farm business”. The definition of non-family owned farms is “those operated by 
cooperatives, by hired managers on behalf of non-operator owners, by large corporations with diverse ownership and any 
small groups of unrelated people”, a definition which has not changed since 1996 [MacDonald, Korb, Hoppe 2013, p. 47].
9 These are sometimes referred to as economies of diversification.
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Where there are “missing” markets and/or “incomplete” markets, and when there 
are doubts about the reliability of the enforcement of contract law, economies of scope 
can occur through the transfer of produce between different parts of the same business. 
Ownership of production removes the need to rely on open market transactions and 
market regulators. Economies of scope are therefore sensitive to societal factors, i.e. 
(i) institutions which govern the country’s business environment (such ones enforcing 
contract law and protecting property rights), (ii) access to investment and working capital, 
(iii) publically funded research and development, and (iv) sector specific policies.
When economies of scope are present they can make the further expansion of the 
business economically viable and sensible, even though diseconomies of scale increase. 
However, diseconomies of scope can also occur. For example, expansion involving too many 
separate products may reduce a company’s focus on their most profitable product lines.
The recent increase in specialisation in the USA suggests these farm businesses are 
no longer benefiting from economies of scope [Chavas, Kim 2010]. 
Deininger and Byerlee conclude that technological advances which reduce 
diseconomies of scale have been a key generic factor in the increase of the farm size. 
A shortage of labour in frontier areas and a greater emphasis on an integrated supply 
chain and the certification of produce have been other important drivers. However, in 
many regions large farms have emerged also in response to policies, poorly protected 
property rights, and market failures related to the availability of infrastructure and 
technology. The ability of large companies to integrate operational units horizontally 
or vertically has proved to be an important advantage. For example, the integration of 
livestock production with grain and oilseed production in Russia and Ukraine assured 
feed supplies; some of the largest agroholdings in Argentina are vertically integrated 
with processors or input suppliers. Vertical integration also allows companies to fill gaps 
in public services: in Brazil and Ukraine a number of large companies constructed their 
own port terminals to shield themselves from the limitations of public facilities. In some 
countries research and development are mostly carried out by private companies. The 
ability to access foreign capital and the possibility of issuing equity on stock markets 
have also been essential, especially where local financial markets are badly distorted. 
Thus in Argentina loans from abroad cost only half the rate that local banks demanded 
from farmers. Large companies have also been able to exercise superior bargaining 
power as markets for agricultural inputs and outputs are often highly concentrated: in 
Argentina large companies are reported to be able to reduce input prices and increase 
output prices by 10–20%. The dispersal of operations across different geographical areas 
is another advantage. It allows large companies to self-insure against weather risks, 
which is particularly important as even in developed countries markets for agricultural 
insurance are often incomplete [Deininger, Byerlee 2011, pp. 707–708].
This overview shows the complexity of the driving forces behind the rise of large 
farms worldwide. Some of the drivers are generic, some are country-specific. As farms 
increase in size they may be disadvantaged by diseconomies of scale but favoured by 
increased economies of scope. These countervailing forces are related to economic, 
political, legal, and market structures. Next section examines factors behind the 
development of large farm businesses in Russia by looking at growth, performance, and 
problems of two agroholdings in the Black Earth region10 of the country.
10 Black Earth region (Chernozemie) in central Russia encompasses Voronezh, Lipetsk, Belgorod, Tambov, Oryol, and 
Kursk oblasts.
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Case study evidence 
Research methodology
We chose to use case study methodology to investigate the development of Russian 
agroholdings because this approach can reveal the detailed information required to assess 
the trade-offs between economies and diseconomies of scale and scope. Two cases were 
chosen from the same geographical area to reduce the influence of different climates, 
employee skill base and availability, and local political priorities on strategic business 
decisions. Both were informed about the aims of the research and readily agreed to 
participate. 
Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire regarding (i) 
business structure and legal status, (ii) business size, growth and development, (iii) 
markets for key products and marketing, (iv) managing large farms, (v) factor (input) 
markets, and (vi) environmental issues. This allowed similar information to be recorded 
in each case while giving interviewees plenty of opportunity to raise issues they believed 
to be particularly important to their own business. Case studies provide comparable but 
tailored information which reveals the similar and different priorities and driving forces 
which underpin each case’s growth and development.
Two cases were selected and visited in summer 2013. Both are publically quoted, 
largely foreign-owned agroholdings, located in the Black Earth region of Russia. Both 
are large even by Russian standards. Therefore these businesses (referred to as X and Z 
to preserve confidentiality) are representative of the most profitable farm businesses in 
the Russian agrarian sector. 
Interviews were conducted with the CEO of Z and several farm managers during 
visits to their farms and a grain store. We interviewed X’s Chief Financial Officer, and 
attended a lecture given by its Managing Director. We visited one of X’s farms and 
talked to senior agronomist and livestock specialists. The information obtained from 
these interviews was supported by later research, including a study of each company’s 
press releases and annual reports.
Growth, performance and plans of Case X
X started in 1994 as an agricultural machinery supplier, expanding into agriculture as 
a producer of grain seeds in 2002. As the business grew it moved into milk production 
“almost by accident”, and from there to beef breeding and rearing. By 2013, X controlled 
182,530 ha in Voronezh, Kursk, Kaluga, Orenburg, Tyumen, and Novosibirsk oblasts, 
employing about 3,000 people. It had approximately 41,180 head of cattle, including 
16,885 forage-fed dairy cows, and produced 345 t of milk daily. 
The company is quoted on a foreign stock exchange, and its Managing Director is 
also a major equity holder. It has a complex structure including 24 subsidiary companies, 
with land owned by subsidiaries of subsidiaries of the parent company. For management 
purposes the company is divided into six regional branches (one for each oblast), headed 
by a regional director who is supported by livestock and crop production specialists. 
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At the time of our visit milk yields were 4,500–10,000 kg/cow, the lower end 
of the range representing yields at dairy farms which X had only recently taken over. 
For comparison, the average milk yield in Voronezh oblast in 2012 was 4713 kg/cow 
[Voronezh statistical year-book 2013, p. 169]. Even with these yields X acknowledged 
that milk production would not be profitable without the existing array of government 
support programmes for livestock and dairy enterprises. Without taking into account 
subsidies, their costs for milk production at modern diary facilities (1700 forage-fed 
cows) were reported to be 45.75 cents/kg of sold milk, while the milk price stood at 
43.50 cent/kg. With subsidies, their costs were 34.75 cent/kg, meaning an 8.75 cent 
profit rather than a 2.25 cent loss per kg of sold milk. This has allowed X to consistently 
report annual trading profits.
Despite its large size X was planning further expansion. Following the same pattern 
as before, it intended to take on more land, increase the number of livestock, and build 
new dairy units, to house and milk between 2,200 and 2,800 cows each. However, they 
also intended to divide their land in Voronezh oblast into three self-contained farms, 
which would require investment in grain handling facilities at two new sites. Dividing 
the farm into smaller units would reduce diseconomies of scale as operational control 
and management becomes easier. This suggests the managerial problems encountered 
at the current size are substantial11. X’s Managing Director believes that the maximum 
viable farm size is 60–70,000 ha, although he is revising his view in the light of the 
potential contribution of precision farming and GIS technology to the management 
and control of field and off-field vehicles. Looking further ahead X remains committed 
to livestock and dairy production. This strategy is based on the Russian government’s 
commitment to produce 90.2% of milk and milk products domestically by 2020 
[FAO 2014, p. 4]. The company’s recent investment in milk processing, albeit on a 
relatively small scale, may be an initial step to becoming a more vertically integrated 
business in future.
Growth, performance and plans of Case Z
Z was founded in 2005 by two family-backed investment trusts with the initial aim of 
purchasing agricultural assets. It was floated on a foreign stock exchange in 2007. Z also 
has a complex structure, including 40 subsidiary companies, 11 of which are operating 
companies. One reason for this is the need to obey the law relating to the ownership of 
farmland by foreign citizens and companies. Similarly complex structures are widely 
used by Russian agroholdings [Skrynnik 2013; Uzun (1) 2012].
By 2013 Z controlled over 308,000 ha of land in Voronezh, Tambov, Kursk, and 
Lipetsk oblasts, about 250,000 ha of which it owned. Yet only 230,900 ha of their land 
bank were in production that year. This was a direct result of the initial business strategy 
to purchase land and other agricultural assets at a time when they believed them to 
be under-priced. Much of the acquired land had been lying fallow for many years, 
and the company had to take extensive and resource consuming actions to return it to 
production. In 2011 Z switched its priority from the acquisition of assets to farming its 
11 There could be other reasons why X might be taking this step, for example, if it wished to generate capital by the sale 
of a part of their business. However, we received no indication of such an intention.
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assets profitably, choosing to specialise in producing arable crops because it wanted 
to farm without being dependent on government support, and Russia is not globally 
competitive in dairy and beef production but has a global competitive advantage in grain 
production.
Farming at a profit has proved to be difficult. Z’s harvest volumes have varied 
widely from year to year from 2008 to 2012, and yields were overall disappointing. 
The company accepts and plans for a yield variation of 30%, which provides a key 
management challenge. In recent years commodity prices have also been highly volatile, 
with a standard deviation of over 40%. The combined volatility of crop yields and 
prices create a substantial revenue risk, so a budgeted revenue of $138 million could 
theoretically vary from $66 to $210 million. Z was only able to declare its first annual 
trading profit in 2012.
Table 3. Financial performance of X and Z
Item Case X Case Z
Revenues 2011 €49.2m US$ 68.1m
Profit 2011 €12.2m US$ -44m
Profit as % of revenue (2011) 24.80% -64.60%
Revenues 2012 €72.3m US$ 147m
Profit 2012 €17.3m US$ 7.2m
Profit as % of revenue (2012) 23.90% 4.90%
By 2013 Z had stopped expanding its land bank and was engaged in asset 
restructuring, selling outlying land and purchasing “in-fill” land. Its long-term strategy 
was to develop into an “insulated”, i.e. self-sufficient, farm business. Four priority areas 
were identified: (i) raise crop yields through improved agronomics; (ii) improve price 
and reduce price volatility through export programs, long-term customer relationships, 
physical forward sales, price hedging, and crop insurance; (iii) improve logistics; 
and (iv) optimise its cost structure. To this end, Z signed a 3-year moratorium of 
understanding with a western based agro-food company (in 2012) with a large range 
of products, a decision that led to investing in potato production and it plans to expand 
the area of irrigated land. Z has also invested in 4 modern grain stores, each with rail 
access to allow grain to be loaded directly onto wagons for delivery to port terminals 
on the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. Z’s export program was part of a strategy to hedge 
prices, as Russia lacks a domestic market for the forward sales of grains. The fact that the 
Russian domestic wheat price tends to be lower than the international price also played 
role in the decision. Z planed in 2015 to sell 30% of its production to this agro-food 
company, 30% through its export program, and the remaining 40% on the spot market 
(where historically the majority of Z sales had been executed).
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Economies of scale of X and Z
This section examines the degree to which X and Z benefit from or are disadvantaged by 
internal and external economies or diseconomies of scale. The analysis focuses on the 
areas where benefits and disadvantages of size are likely to occur: the management of 
production process, the control of labour and marketing, and access to capital and land.
Management of field work 
Both farms have very large distances from their northern to their southern boundary. For 
X it was 70 km as the crow flies, 120 km by road. The direct north to south distance for 
Z was 100 km, with a railway (with very few crossings) dividing its land into two, in a 
ratio of 40:60.
Managing these large areas presents severe operational challenges, especially 
given the short growing season, very hot summers and cold winters. Due to the climatic 
conditions not all land can always be planted. Therefore a key management decision for 
both companies is how much surplus capacity they should carry? Should they gear-up 
for an average season and risk leaving large areas unplanted, or should they equip for the 
worst-case scenario and face higher equipment finance and depreciation charges? One 
of the costs of being under-equipped is the late completion of work, which is difficult to 
estimate in terms of yield reduction. For all farm businesses timeliness is vital because 
a delay in one operation can have knock-on consequences for the next, increasing the 
severity of yield loss. Z admitted that they had been under-equipped but were taking 
measures to address this problem12. 
Both X and Z use the block system, i.e. several neighbouring fields are farmed 
together as a single block. Growing crops in blocks rather than individual field rotation 
helps reduce logistical problems and assists with the supervision of the workforce. 
It allows large areas of land to be managed in a single visit by a large and well equipped, 
self-sufficient mobile teams, (which would include mobile workstations, fuel tankers 
and all inputs required). Z’s blocks tend to be slightly smaller, at 2,000 ha than X’s at 
3,000 ha.
Labour management
The large size of the area farmed by X and Z represents a significant additional problem 
for maintaining managerial control over operations, in particular over the quality of the 
work done. Much field-work is devolved to workers who cannot be readily monitored: 
it is impossible for farm managers to supervise every activity even on small farms. 
This substantial logistical management requires meticulous planning and depends on 
every employee having a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities in each 
12 However, we were unable to obtain sufficiently detailed data to compare asset registers of the two businesses.
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“campaign”. Both companies spend considerable time and money training their staff 
so they are more reliable in-field. Both companies employed Russian workers for their 
field and livestock work, but X also employed Russian managers and specialists, while 
Z continued to rely on foreign citizens who had impressive credentials in their speciality 
area but limited experience of working in Russia.
To help with labour management and control Z has decided to invest into GIS 
technology, with intention to fit satellite location finders to all their 700 or so mobile 
units and connect them to a central management terminal, enabling real time monitoring 
of the individual and collective performance. This should improve logistics and thereby 
timeliness. It may also be another step towards combating theft. To the extent that all its 
dairy units are zero grazed, and milking is a daily routine conducted under cover where 
close supervision is possible, X has some advantages over Z. However, maintaining 
fertility management in large herds provides a considerable operational challenge. Since 
our visit X has also installed GIS though they did not mention their intention to do so 
during our interviews. 
Both companies still used the “norm” system to calculate weekly wages. The norm 
system was inherited from the working practices on farms in the soviet period and is 
principally geared to incentivise workers to turn up and actually work. This makes it 
biased towards the quantity of work done rather than its quality. In European terms, the 
norm system can be considered similar to, albeit more complicated than, the “piece work” 
system. It is extremely bureaucratic and imposes significant administrative costs on the 
business as it requires a large number of office staff. Moreover, it represents the practice of 
penalising workers for poor performance, rather than encouraging workers to identify and 
discuss problems. If norms are set at the wrong level, workers will need to work too fast or 
too slowly to earn their average wage, and this is another way in which this payment system 
can affect the quality of the work done. These inefficiencies add to transaction costs, as 
similar problems are likely to recur without senior management being able to determine 
what is causing them, and as quality management has to be devolved to a supervisor, it can 
be costly and difficult to trace who was the cause of the poor work. Both companies would 
like to change this payment system, to make it less expensive to operate and to incentivise 
quality of work, but are not quite sure how to do this.
Apart from continuous tweaking the norm system, X has taken one practical step to 
reduce the cost of paying wages by paying directly into their employees’ bank accounts. 
A bank has installed cash point machines in X’s largest farmyards. Neither X nor Z 
remunerate employees with “payment in kind”, as this is a costly and time consuming 
practice (though both sell farm produce to their workers at cost).
Both companies lay-off the workers when they take over a new farm, re-employing 
only those whom they deem suitable. However, X, being a livestock business, pays its 
workers throughout the year while at Z many workers are laid-off over the winter period. 
Both companies reported a shortage of qualified and reliable workers, but believed they 
were paying very competitive wages. The direct labour costs are a small part of expenses 
in both companies: Z’s labour costs accounted only for 3% of direct production costs, 
and X’s labour costs were 9% of the total costs of 1 kg of sold milk.
Managerial difficulties reflect deep-rooted problems with the labour market in rural 
Russia, where unemployment, low incomes, deprivation, and outflow of young people 
are major social problems [Fomin 2013]. Russia still has a relatively high proportion 
of rural population. In Voronezh oblast it was 34.1% in 2012 [Voronezh Oblast 2013, 
p. 31], and the level of rural unemployment was 8.4% which is almost twice the urban 
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level [Voronezh Oblast 2013, p. 47]. The average monthly wage was 14,296 roubles in 
agriculture, compared to 19,538 roubles in the economy in general [Voronezh Oblast 
2013, p. 60], and there was continuous out-migration from the countryside [Voronezh 
Oblast 2013, p. 39]. Our interviewees said the ablest people tend to leave the countryside, 
and many who stay are not employable. Despite an apparent excess of labour in the 
rural areas employers need to do more than simply pay above its market price to recruit 
and retain workers. In rural Russia the supportive role of large farming enterprises 
is still generally accepted as a norm [Shubin 2012; Davydova, Franks 2006]. This is 
partly why both companies supported local communities. X sponsored a kindergarten, 
a secondary school, sport facilities, and local churches, but was particularly generous to 
their employees with a housing programme for its specialists and providing interest-free 
loans for housing improvement and purchasing personal vehicles. Z provided financial 
support to local events and social projects.
On-farm theft is another problem related to the “human factor”. Both companies 
have a zero-tolerance policy: theft leads to instant dismissal and Z also automatically 
initiates legal proceedings. Both companies employed a high proportion of their 
workforce in security: for example a 50,000 ha farm of Z’s which we visited employed 
65 in security-related duties out of a workforce of 330. A FAO & EBRD report estimated 
agroholding spending on combating pilfering and vandalism on their farms (be it 
spending on guard services or on social programmes in the villages they operate “in 
order to maintain the peace”) at around 10% of total production costs, “which means a 
10% loss in competitiveness”. The report also identified a link between the development 
of agroholdings and rural unemployment. The modernisation of farming undertaken by 
agroholdings increases labour productivity and correspondingly decreases demand for 
labour in rural areas. Moreover, faced with costly control over workers in large-scale 
farm enterprises, agroholdings tend to further substitute labour with machinery. But 
workers who have been laid-off from farms can find no alternative employment in the 
villages because of the historically chronic lack of non-agricultural jobs in rural areas, 
while the vastness of most Russian regions means that commuting to town for work is 
not an option either. Consequently, “the more agroholdings develop their business, the 
more unemployment is seen in the rural areas of their operation”, which causes social 
tension [FAO and EBRD 2009, p. 48]. One could add: the more agroholdings develop 
their business, the more they undermine the social foundation of their productivity. 
A cheap but not very diligent workforce and hostile villagers are not conducive to 
success. Finding themselves locked into this contradiction, agroholdings have responded 
by fortifying their farms against a hostile environment and by positioning themselves as 
sponsors in the area. In the long-run support for social programmes might be a better 
investment than paying security staff, but lifting entire villages out of poverty is a 
formidable task even for these large businesses.
Sales
In Voronezh oblast, X produced 320 t of milk daily—about a quarter of the milk production 
of the entire oblast. X did not forward sell their products, and no production input materials 
or fuels were purchased this way. Longer-term supply contracts were only used between 
X’s individual production locations and processing plants, typically without stipulating 
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binding quantities. Nonetheless, in 2012 X had two customers with a share of revenue 
exceeding 10%—payments from one amounted to EUR 16.7 million (23.1%), and from 
the other to EUR 11 million (15.2%) of the total revenue of the company.
Z was seeking to sell forward significant quantities of their products. It hedged 
its production, using CBOT13 and MATIF14 futures and options, locking into forward 
prices when physical sales were not possible. These are the strategies employed by large 
agro-businesses in the USA, where bigger risks, associated with larger size, are offset by 
a range of financial instruments.
Access to capital
Both companies grew very quickly, raising capital on foreign capital markets. In 2012 
X issued two corporate bonds for €50m and €60m with attractive interest rates (paid 
in Euros). Z was founded by two family-backed investment funds. Following several 
private placements15 and a bond issue of €55m, Z successfully raised additional capital 
through an IPO in 2007. It refinanced several bonds, and raised additional capital through 
a rights issue in 2012, primarily to finance the link with the agro-food company and to 
supply additional working capital. This reliance on foreign capital markets has created 
significant currency risks for both companies.
Z has avoided taking loans from Russian banks but is considering changing this 
policy. X decided to borrow from Russian banks because of the subsidised interest 
payments. In summer 2013 the market interest rate was 11%, but investment on buildings 
and infrastructure attracted 100% interest rebate. Investment in cows attracted a 70% 
rebate, and in equipment a 50% rebate, thereby costing the company only 3% and 5.5% 
respectively. In 2012 X received government subsidies to the amount of EUR 3,336,000 
as on-going production support, another EUR 1,334,000 for investment in infrastructure, 
and EUR 8,674,000 for the purchase of breeding livestock. According to X, the Federal 
working capital interest rate subsidy programme was a success even though changes 
introduced in 2013 extended the period between the paying the interest and receiving 
the rebate. Although the programme was open to all livestock and dairy businesses, 
X’s size and reputation helped them to attract these grants, and to withstand delayed 
rebate payments.
Access to land
X owns about 55% of its land bank, Z 81.2%, the remaining land in both companies was 
farmed under long-term leases. Both companies paid their rents promptly and regularly. 
However, there are no land tenure regulations relating to fixing a fair rent in Russia, and 
no rural land valuation service is available to arbitrate between landlord and tenant.
13 Chicago Board of Trade
14 Marche a Terme International de France (futures exchange and clearing house in Paris)
15 A funding round of securities which are sold through private offering to a number of chosen investors.
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Both companies paid for the registration of land. Z calculated that it paid on 
average $250/ha, but estimated it cost the same to organise the registration, arrange 
for a land survey, and pay the land share owner’s registration fee. Similar figures were 
given at X. Federal law allows each oblast to determine how it operates land registration, 
which results in differences in the survey and registration procedures. This increases 
land acquisition costs as area-specific expertise is needed. Both companies used a team 
of lawyers to register and purchase land.
It remains difficult to raise capital in Russia for investing in agriculture. There is 
no practice of using land value as collateral. The short time since land has started being 
traded, and different restrictions on how land can be registered and transferred at oblast 
level, mean that land values are not yet established. The very large areas which remain 
nominally owned by land share owners may soon come under local administrative 
control. Should this land be brought to the market, it might depress current land rental 
and purchase values. Furthermore, bank liquidity has been restricted post-2008, as banks 
were required to increase capital retention. All these factors benefit large companies with 
access to overseas capital markets, albeit exposing them to exchange rate risks.
Economies of scope of X and Z
Diversification as a survival strategy is more necessary where there are unpredictable 
markets and unpredictable weather conditions. X’s core business is milk production 
(55.6% of total revenues in 2013), its crop production focuses on producing seeds, and 
fodder for the company’s herds. X also grows crops for sale, including wheat, maize, 
sugar beet and oilseed. Its meat production is relatively insignificant. Although almost 
self-sufficient in fodder, it purchases heifers from abroad. While X estimates its year-to-
year yield variability as high as 50% it decided in 2013 not to pay the full premium of €1 
million for crop insurance. This decision to carry its crop production risks means internal 
diversification measures become even more important, which X achieves by the regional 
distribution of their cultivation areas. X does not invest heavily in research.
Z deliberately focuses on producing commodities in which Russia is globally 
competitive. However, the ban on grain exports in 2010–2011 adversely affected Z’s 
market revenues. The partnership with an agro-food company allowed Z to grow 
higher value crops on contract. The company buys insurance against extreme weather 
events. Z found it could not rely on publicly-funded research to improve yields, and in 
2011  established a 36 ha crop trial site. It has also invested in shipping grain from their 
store via rail and directly contracts railway wagons rather than buying services from 
transport operators.
The lack or limited efficiency of policing state regulations increases the cost 
of doing business, and raises exposure to counter-party risk (for example, bankruptcy 
or fraud coupled with little chance of redress through expensive and time-consuming 
legal action). The ability to avoid dependence on others in such a business environment 
is an important source of economies of scope. As shown above, both companies seek 
to minimise their reliance on open-market transactions to source inputs and services.
When law enforcement is unreliable, relationships with local and regional 
administrations become critical. Z and X differ in their approach to the oblast 
administration. X deliberately works with local administrations’ perspectives and wishes, 
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this was one reason why it developed into livestock farming which local authorities 
prefer because these enterprises are encouraged by federal agricultural programmes, and 
because such farms employ more staff per ha than arable-based farms, thereby helping to 
reduce rural unemployment. X’s senior management work hard “meeting and greeting” 
oblast administrators allowing them to address issues in person whenever possible. 
Z chose to focus on operating profitability rather than administrative wishes, and 
considers its responsibilities as a business largely confined to bringing employment and 
tax revenues to the area. Relationships with the oblast administration were not helped 
by difficulties in planning and coordinating a large investment in land irrigation and by 
the cancellation of plans to build a potato storage warehouse following a late change 
to local bye-laws. Neither X or Z were prepared to comment on how issues related 
to the administration of the law and apparent administrative arbitrariness affects the 
management of their businesses.
Summary of evidence
Both companies enjoy benefits of size, for example, being able to raise capital on foreign 
stock markets, to employ experts to arrange land registration and acquisition, X spreads 
its risk by the wide geographic spread of its farms, and Z’s size has allowed it to justify 
investing in a crop-growing research station. 
But both companies also face diseconomies of scale with regard to labour 
management, logistical operational control and quality control. This is consistent with 
earlier research which found no inherent economies of size in farm production in Russia 
[Deininger, Byerlee 2011, p. 707]. Responses to these problems were similar in X and Z: 
investment in GIS and precision farming. How successful this will be in practice remains 
to be seen. The technological solutions to the labour management problems will lead to 
a further reduction in the labour force and thereby have important implications for rural 
communities. The companies need to be sensitive to how their presence impacts upon 
the social fabric of the Russian countryside and find a way to avoid aggravating existing 
problems.
Institutional arrangements determine the extent to which there are economies 
of scope. Both companies seek to benefit from economies of scope. Both have been 
stretched by the difficult business environment in Russia and in the agro-food sector in 
particular. X uses much of its crop production as input to its dairy enterprise. Z’s contract 
with the large processor with regard to supplying it with a wide range of commodities 
has allowed it to diversify into the production of high value crops, and because 
Z’s counter party is a western-based company, it can have more confidence that contractual 
obligations will be honoured. Having horizontally integrated their businesses both 
X and Z are now taking initial steps towards vertical integration: X into milk processing, 
and Z by securing market contracts. 
The strengths of both companies are in the use of modern production techniques and 
technologies, and communication systems for labour management and supervision. Both 
companies are likely to enjoy capital growth through the appreciation of their assets, and 
both have further productivity potential. They both have weaknesses, some of which are 
similar and some are different. Z reports poor profit levels, and X’s profits are dependent 
on government subsidies. The companies are exposed to exchange rate movements 
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through their bond obligations which are denominated in foreign currencies, whilst their 
assets are valued in roubles. Both companies are also affected by government policy 
and foreign policy but in different ways. Russia’s entry into the WTO is will eventually 
require its use of tariffs to be replaced by less trade-distorting measures. This may benefit 
farming as these tend to have higher transfer efficiencies than tariffs (i.e. a higher share 
of support subsidies is captured by farm businesses) [Portugal (undated), pp. 24–25], 
although there are expectations of considerable difficulties [Barsukova 2013, Barsukova 
2014, Petrick 2014]. These changes are of more concern to X because of its focus on 
subsidy supported dairy production, but current trade embargoes and export tariffs are 
likely to have a larger adverse effect on Z because of its use of export markets. 
Conclusions
In post-Soviet Russia much larger agroholdings have emerged in place of collective 
farms. Unlike the USA, where the trend towards bigger farms has been driven mostly by 
technological and institutional advances which help to overcome diseconomies of scale, 
in Russia it has been heavily dependent on other factors. The reasons why agroholdings 
have emerged in Russia include missing or incomplete markets, poor enforcement of 
contract law and property rights, limited access to investment and working capital, 
a difficult business environment, as well as sector-specific policies that benefit (not 
always intentionally) larger businesses.
The distribution of small packages of land in the form of land shares to a large 
number of people made it difficult to collect the principal input into a farm with single 
ownership on an effective business scale. This created breathing space for the former 
collective farms to adapt to the new market environment. From the 1990s to early 2000s 
loss-making farms which could convince the authorities that they might become viable 
were helped to avoid bankruptcy. In reality, there was little alternative to supporting the 
large number of loss making corporate farms because of their central role as the primary 
employer of large areas of the countryside [Franks, Davydova 2005]. Agroholdings 
have moved into the gap created by the inability of many former collective farms to use 
borrowed time to become profitable. There were too few endogenous family-based farms 
established after 1992, and those that remained in business during the 2000s could not 
compete with agroholdings in the acquisition of land16. Consequently, a new generation 
of even larger farms has become the backbone of food production and increasingly of 
food processing and distribution. 
A very bureaucratic regulation system, coupled with poorly enforced contract law 
and administrative arbitrariness, presents a business environment that is difficult to 
work in. Add to this; (i) substantial production risks due to the volatility of yields, (ii) 
financial risks associated with exchange rates and market price volatility, (iii) working 
in a sector that has substantial government intervention which (iv) frequently changes 
priorities—investors need the expectation of considerable returns to sink cash into 
what is traditionally an asset-rich cash-poor business. It is not by accident that some 
agroholdings started as investment-motivated rather than income-motivated ventures, 
16 The incomplete land market is a greater problem for smaller farm businesses. Lerman argues on the basis of data for 
the European and North American countries that land leasing is conducive to larger farms [Lerman 2001, p. 8].
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aiming to purchase land at a time when it was thought to be under-priced. It can be seen 
as a part of the global rush for land reserves which are expected to become increasingly 
scarce due to the combined global trends of the soaring world population, increasing 
water shortages, and diminishing productivity growth [Visser, Mamonova, Spoor 
2012]. The law in Russia obliges owners of farmland to either cultivate land or sell it. 
Consequently, agroholdings cannot simply hoard land in expectation of its appreciation. 
They must farm, and farm profitably, as even a large business cannot sustain operating 
losses indefinitely.
Both case study companies have made substantial investments in fixed and working 
capital, in the process creating businesses that incorporate dozens of former kolkhozes 
and sovkhozes. It was simply not possible for the initial owners of land shares to build 
up businesses of this scale. Although smaller family farms do exist, it is necessary to be 
a large company to take on the financial, business and political risks involved in making 
substantial investment in land, to improve and modernise equipment and farming 
techniques, and provide training to overcome deficiencies in labour and managerial skills. 
The evidence in this study suggests that the costs of maintaining operational control over 
such large areas are higher than the financial benefits associated with size. Technology is 
likely to have an impact on this balance between costs and benefits. Investments in GIS 
and precision farming, if thoughtfully used, should help remove logistical bottlenecks 
and create efficiency savings. However, in-house employee training and changing 
expectations regarding the working environment may take longer to deliver benefits.
These large farms exist because their economies of scope offset their diseconomies 
of scale. But will this be the case in future? How long economies of scope last will 
depend on reforms of the incomplete markets, which may be quick for some markets 
but take longer for others. The rate and success of market reforms are likely to depend 
on the priorities of Russia’s industrial and agricultural policies (including the method 
of support for farm businesses), on the nature of reforms introduced to public sector 
institutions, in particular, to the legal system and capital markets, and on improvements 
in the provision of public goods for general use, such as research, development, and 
transport infrastructure. Therefore the development of agroholdings and their likely 
longevity are both determined by the rate at which the Russian economy is reformed, 
as this will reduce economies of scope. If this happens, agroholdings will have less 
incentive to maintain a size which incurs such diseconomies of scale. Our evidence 
suggests that the most serious diseconomies of scale are related to labour management. 
Whether agroholdings will help to solve the social problems of Russian countryside, and 
in doing so help themselves, or whether these problems will prove to be their Achilles 
heel is yet to be seen.
References
Allen D.W., Lueck D. (1998) The Nature of the Farm. Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 41, 
no 2, pp. 343–386.
Barsukova S.Yu. (2013) Vekhi agrarnoi politiki Rossii v 2000-e gody [Milestones of Russian 
Agrarian Policy in 2000s]. Mir Rossii, vol. 22, no 1, pp. 3–28.
Barsukova S.Yu. (2014) Agrarnyi bisnes Rossii v usloviyakh WTO: ozhidaniya i realnost’ [Russia 
Agrarian Businesses Under WTO Terms: Expectations and Realities]. Mir Rossii, vol. 23, 
no 4, pp. 98–124.
152 I. Davydova, J.R. Franks
Chavas J.-P., Kim K. (2010) Economies of Diversification: A Generalization and Decomposition 
of Economies of Scope. International Journal of Production Economies, vol. 126, no 2, 
pp. 229–235.
Davydova I., Franks J.R. (2006) Responses to Agrarian Reforms in Russia: Evidence from 
Novosibirsk Oblast. Journal of Rural Studies, vol. 22, no 1, pp. 39–54.
Deininger K., Byerlee D. (2011) The Rise of LargeFarms in Land Abundant Countries: Do They 
Have a Future. World Development, vol. 40, no 4, pp. 701–714.
Fadeeva O. (2009) Zemel’nyi vopros na sele: nastupit li moment istiny? [The Land Question in the 
Countryside: Will We Ever Have “the Moment of Truth”?]. Ekonomicheskaya sotsiologiya, 
vol. 10, no 5, pp. 50–71.
FAO (2014) Russia’s Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural and Food Products: An Initial 
Assessmen. Trade and Markets Division. Rome, Italy. p. 4. Available at: http://www.fao.
org/3/a-i4055e.pdf, accessed 10 March 2015
FAO and EBRD (2009) Russian Federation. Analysis of Agribusinesses Sector in Southern 
Russia. FAO Investment Centre, EBRD Cooperation Programme. Available at: http://www.
fao.org/docrep/012/aj281e/aj281e00.htm, accessed 10 March 2015.
Fomin O.S. (2013) Upravlenie razvitiem sotsialno-trudovykh otnoshenii na sele [Management of 
the Changing Social and Labour Relations in the Countryside], Kursk.
Goskomstat (2013). Russian statistical year-book. Available at: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/
b13_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d3/14-02.htm, accessed 10 March 2015.
Franks J.R., Davydova I. (2005) Reforming the Farming Sector in Russia: New Options for Old 
Problems. Outlook on Agriculture, vol. 34, no 2, pp. 97–103.
Hockmann H., Bokusheva R., Bezlepkina I. (2007) Agroholdings Membership: Does That Make 
a Difference in Performance? Paper presented at the 102th EAAE Seminar “Superlarge 
Farming Companies: Emergence and Possible Impacts”, Moscow. 
Koester U. (2005) A Revival of Large Farms in Eastern Europe – How Important Are Institutions? 
Agricultural Economics, vol. 32, no 1, pp. 103–113.
Lerman Z. (2001) A Decade of Land Reform and Farm Restructuring: What Russia Can Learn 
from the World Experience. Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, vol. 40, no 1, 
pp. 5–28.
MacDonald J.M., Korb P., Hoppe R.A. (2013) Farm Size and the Organization of US Crop 
Farming. Economic Research Service Report Number 152. United States Department 
of Agriculture. Washington, USA. Available at: www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err-
economic-research-report/err152.asx, accessed 17 December 2014.
Petrick M. (2007) A Model of Manager-induced Organisational Stability in Post-soviet 
Agriculture. Paper presented at the 104th (joint) EAAE-IAAE Seminar Agricultural 
Economics in Transition: “What Was Expected, What We Observed, the Lessons Learned”, 
Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest. 
Petrick M. (2014) Modernizing Russia’s Cattle and Dairy Sectors under WTO Conditions: 
Insights from East Germany. Mir Rossii, vol. 23, no 4, p. 125–147.
Portugal L. (undated) Methodology for the Measurement of Support and Use in Policy Evaluation. 
OECD. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/agriculture/agricultural-policies/1937457.pdf, 
accessed 10 March 2015.
Rylko D., Jolly R. (2005) Russia’s New Agricultural Operators: Their Emergence, Growth, and 
Impact. Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 47, no 1, pp. 115–126.
Schmitt G. (1991) Why Is the Agriculture of Advanced Western Economies Still Organized by 
Family Farms? Will This Continue to Be So in the Future? European Review of Agricultural 
Economics, vol. 18, pp. 443–458.
Shubin S. (2012) Understanding Care for the Poor in Rural Russia. Journal of Rural Studies, 
vol. 28, no 2, pp. 89–98.
Skrynnik I. (2013) Khozyaeva zemli russkoi: kak inostrantsy skupili okolo 3 mln ga selkhozugodii 
[Masters of Russian Land: How Foreigners Have Bought About 3 Million ha of Farmland]. 
Available at: http://www.forbes.ru/kompanii/resursy/245027-khozyaeva-zemli-russkoi-
kak-inostrantsy-skupili-okolo-3-mln-ga-selskokhozyai, accessed 10 March 2015.
Uzun V. (2010) Klassifikatsiya selkhozproizvoditelei Rossii na osnove analiza dannykh VSHP 
2006 [Classification of Agricultural Producers of Russia on the Basis of Analysis of Data 
153
Возрождение крупных хозяйств в России: почему агрохолдинги доминируют  
в российском аграрном секторе, стр. 133–159
of the All-Russia Agricultural Census-2006]. Available at: http://www.viapi.ru/publication/
e-biblio/detail.php?IBLOCK_ID=45&SECTION_ID=1069&ELEMENT_ID=31190), 
accessed 10 March 2015.
Uzun V. (1) (2012) U kogo segodnya zemlya, nikto ne znaet [Nobody Knows Who Holds the 
Land Today]. Agrarnoe obozrenie, vol. 3, no 31, p. 17.
Uzun V. (2) (2012) Agrokholdingi Rossii: identifikatsiya, klassifikatsiya, rol’, kontsentratsiya 
zemlepolzovaniya [Agro-holdings of Russia: Identification, Classification, Role, 
Concentration of Land Use]. Zemelnaya akkumulyatsiya v nachale XXI veka [Land 
Accumulation at the Beginning of XXI Century], Moscow: Delo, pp. 126–142.
Uzun V., Saraikin V., Gataulina E., Shagaida N., Yanbykh R., Mary S., Gomez y Paloma S. (2014) 
Prospects of the Farming Sector and Rural Development in View of Food Security: The 
Case of the Russian Federation. JRC Scientific and Policy Reports, European Commission. 
Available at: http://www.jrc.ec.europa.eu, accessed 16 September 2014.
Visser O., Mamonova N., Spoor M. (2012) Oligarchs, Megafarms and Land Reserves: Understanding 
Land Grabbing in Russia. The Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 39, no 3–4, pp. 899–913.
Voronezh Oblast (2013) Voronezh Statistical Year-Book. 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
Возрождение крупных хозяйств в России: почему агрохолдинги 
доминируют в российском аграрном секторе17
И. ДАВЫДОВА*, Д. ФРАНКС**
*Давыдова Ирина Владимировна – научный сотрудник, Отдел сельского хозяйства, пищевой про-
мышленности и развития сельских территорий, Университет Ньюкасла. Адрес: Agriculture Building, 
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, Great Britain. E-mail: ira.davydova@gmail.com
**Франкс Джереми – старший преподаватель, Отдел сельского хозяйства, пищевой промышленно-
сти и развития сельских территорий, Университет Ньюкасла. Адрес: Agriculture Building, Newcastle 
University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, Great Britain. E-mail: j.r.franks@ncl.ac.uk
Цитирование: Davydova I., Franks J. (2015) The Rise and Rise of Large Farms: Why Agroholdings 
Dominate Russia’s Agricultural Sector. Mir Rossii, vol. 24, no 3, pp. 133–159
Ключевые слова: агрохолдинги, неполные/отсутствующие рынки, экономия на 
масштабе производства, экономия от совмещения
Первоначальной целью рыночных реформ сельского хозяйства в России яви-
лась замена крупных и неэффективных коллективных хозяйств на относительно 
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небольшие семейные фермы, характерные для западных экономик. Но развитие 
фермерских хозяйств шло медленно, и к 2012 г. их доля в сельскохозяйственной 
продукции составляла лишь 8,9%. Между тем, как показала классификация сель-
скохозяйственных производителей на основе данных переписи 2006 г., концен-
трация товарного сельскохозяйственного производства в России очень высока. 
Основная масса товарной продукции производится в крупных и очень крупных 
хозяйствах: в 2006 г. всего 0,113% сельскохозяйственных производителей контро-
лировали 81,5% посевной площади, и на них приходилось 48,3% поголовья круп-
ного рогатого скота, 47,1% свиней и 62,8% птицы. 
Среди крупных сельскохозяйственных производителей агрохолдинги, явля-
ясь прямым результатом рыночных реформ, представляют наибольший интерес: 
в 2006 г. в них входило 21% всех крупных и средних сельскохозяйственных орга-
низаций, а доля в товарной продукции достигла 26,5%. Своими размерами агро-
холдинги превосходили колхозы и совхозы, на смену которым пришли. В научной 
литературе развитие агрохолдингов в России объясняется: (1) культурными детер-
минантами поведения, сложившимися в царское и советское время и препятству-
ющими индивидуализации сельскохозяйственного производства; (2) тяготением 
к агроходингам со стороны местных органов власти и (3) «захватом земли» в каче-
стве движущего мотива создания мегаферм. 
В настоящей статье вопрос о причинах возникновения агрохолдингов в Рос-
сии и их вероятного будущего рассматривается через призму анализа основных 
движущих сил, определивших тенденцию в сторону крупномасштабного сельско-
хозяйственного производства в других странах мира; приводятся результаты ис-
следования двух расположенных в черноземной зоне России агрохолдингов. 
Всемирный рывок в сторону  
крупномасштабного сельскохозяйственного производства
Россия не уникальна в отношении развития агрохолдингов: за последние двадцать 
лет во многих богатых земельными ресурсами регионах мира наблюдается рост 
инвестиций в крупномасштабное сельскохозяйственное производство, основан-
ное на корпоративной модели. Эта тенденция часто сопровождается увеличени-
ем концентрации землевладения, когда хозяйства с землей 10 тыс. га и больше 
горизонтально интегрированы в холдинговые компании, контролирующие сотни 
тысяч гектаров. Характерна также и вертикальная интеграция, объединяющая 
в одну холдинговую структуру сельскохозяйственное производство, переработку, 
маркетинг и транспортировку на экспорт. При этом результаты деятельности та-
ких компаний с точки зрения экономической эффективности, воздействия на окру-
жающую среду и социальных последствий их присутствия значительно разнятся 
в зависимости от страны. 
В государствах Восточной Европы и Средней Азии итоги рыночных реформ 
сельского хозяйства зависели от наделенности страны земельными ресурсами, от 
ее институциональной системы, состояния инфраструктуры, доли сельского хо-
зяйства в трудовых ресурсах и выбранного способа проведения реформ. В сель-
скохозяйственном производстве богатых землей государств, разделивших землю 
коллективных хозяйств между их членами, в настоящее время доминируют корпо-
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рации. В России, на Украине и в Казахстане (самых богатых землей) наблюдается 
наивысший уровень концентрации землепользования в агрохолдингах.
В США (богатых земельными ресурсами, но обладающих к тому же и вы-
сокоразвитой рыночной экономикой) в этот период также отмечалась тенденция 
к увеличению размера сельскохозяйственных предприятий (особенно в животно-
водстве), при этом численность хозяйств средней величины сокращалась, а ко-
личество мелких ферм росло; владельцы последних совмещали занятия фермер-
ством с другой работой или пополняли свой доход за счет пенсий и сбережений. 
Следует подчеркнуть, что эти долгосрочные сдвиги сопровождались усилением 
специализации. 
Основной движущей силой укрупнения хозяйств являлись новые технологии 
(в особенности трудосберегающие). Эти изменения повлияли и на занятость в сель-
ском хозяйстве: углубление специализации усугубило сезонные колебания в по-
требности в рабочей силе, в результате чего количество постоянных работников 
в сельском хозяйстве снизилось, а число нанятых по контракту на короткий сезон 
увеличилось. Рост масштабности и узкая специализации предприятия привели к по-
вышению рисков, связанных с колебаниями цен, погодой, болезнями и вредителя-
ми, и для минимизации этих рисков крупные корпорации прибегли к контрактам 
и различным финансовым инструментам. Поскольку в настоящее время крупные 
хозяйства более рентабельны, можно ожидать, что тенденция к увеличению размера 
хозяйств будет сохраняться. Важно заметить, что, несмотря на это, основой сельско-
хозяйственного производства в США остается семейная ферма, тем не менее даже 
там самые крупные хозяйства принадлежат корпорациям, а не отдельным семьям.
Экономия на масштабах производства и экономия от совмещения  
в качестве движущей силы увеличения размеров хозяйств
Особенностью сельского хозяйства является то, что экономия, обусловленная ро-
стом масштаба производства, может прекратиться и перейти в ее противополож-
ность – дезэкономию – при относительно небольшом размере предприятия. Это 
вызвано трудностями сохранения управленческого контроля над производством 
в ситуации, когда многие важные решения должны приниматься работниками на 
месте. Однако преимущества увеличения размера предприятия (например, занятие 
ведущей позиции в производстве определенного товара) могут перевешивать это 
обстоятельство и обусловливать дальнейший рост.
Крупные предприятия могут получать экономию и от совмещения. В ситу-
ации отсутствующих или неполных рынков или сомнения в надежности защиты 
контрактных отношений законом экономия от совмещения возникает посредством 
самодостаточности, поскольку владение факторами производства позволяет избе-
жать зависимости от других производителей и официальных лиц. Таким образом, 
институциональная среда существенно влияет на возможность получения эконо-
мии от совмещения, а ее наличие может компенсировать дезэкономию на масшта-
бах производства.
В США усиливающаяся специализация свидетельствует о том, что там сель-
скохозяйственные предприятия не получают экономию от совмещения. Напро-
тив, в развивающихся странах и странах с переходной экономикой возможность 
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интегрировать различные предприятия в горизонтальные и вертикальные струк-
туры оказалась важным преимуществом крупных компаний, позволяющим ком-
пенсировать отсутствие или недостаточное развитие рынков и преодолевать ин-
ституциональные и инфраструктурные недостатки страны. Достоинства таких 
компаний включают в себя возможность получения кредитов за рубежом и более 
выгодной цены в переговорах с поставщиками и покупателями, а также миними-
зацию погодных рисков, благодаря ведению бизнеса в нескольких географически 
отдаленных районах. 
Результаты исследования
Информация, собранная во время полевого исследования, проведенного летом 
2013 г., была впоследствии дополнена анализом годовых отчетов компаний и мате-
риалов в средствах массовой информации.
Агрохолдинг X – один из крупнейших производителей молока в России с зе-
мельным банком более 180 тыс. га в шести областях, располагает общим стадом 
численностью около 41 тыс. крупного рогатого скота, в том числе 17 тыс. коров; 
в компании занято 3 000 работников, она котируется на зарубежной бирже, дирек-
тор является ее главным акционером. Агрохолдинг X имеет сложную структуру, 
в которой земля принадлежит внучатым компаниям. Во время полевого исследова-
ния летом 2013 г. надои молока составляли 4 500–10 000 литров с коровы, причем 
нижний предел относился к фермам, недавно перешедшим в агрохолдинг. Одна-
ко следует отметить, что на тот момент без государственных субсидий и даже на 
новых фермах с современным оборудованием производство молока не было бы 
рентабельным. Несмотря на свой большой размер, компания X не отказалась от 
планов дальнейшей экспансии в рамках животноводческой специализации – стра-
тегии, связанной с решением правительства добиться самообеспечения страны 
основными продуктами питания. Недавние капиталовложения в переработку мо-
лока, хотя и незначительные, позволяют предполагать, что в будущем холдинг X 
сможет стать вертикально интегрированной компанией.
Агрохолдинг Z специализируется на выращивании пшеницы, масляничных 
культур, картофеля и сахарной свеклы; его земельный банк в четырех областях со-
ставляет 308 тыс. га, из которых в 2013 г. были засеяны 250 тыс. га; численность 
работников – около 2 000 чел. Компания Z котируется на бирже за рубежом и име-
ет сложную структуру с дочерними и внучатыми предприятиями, аналогичную 
холдингу X. Изначально компания Z возникла как инвестиционный фонд для при-
обретения земли в России, но в 2011 г. его приоритеты сменились на обеспечение 
рентабельного производства. В выборе специализации определяющим было жела-
ние избежать зависимости от государственной поддержки благодаря производству 
конкурентоспособной продукции. Однако недостаточно высокая и неустойчивая 
урожайность (30-процентное стандартное отклонение) и резкие колебания цен на 
продукцию (40-процентное стандартное отклонение) привели к тому, что за пери-
од своей производственной деятельности (2008–2012 гг.) холдинг Z получил годо-
вую прибыль только в 2012 г., а к 2013 г. компания Z прекратила экспансию и заня-
лась рационализацией своего земельного банка. Долговременная стратегия этого 
агрохолдинга направлена на создание изолированного самодостаточного бизнеса, 
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способного минимизировать ценовые риски через долговременные контрактные 
отношения, хедирование на зарубежных биржах и предварительные продажи. 
В поисках источников капиталовложений при продаже своей продукции, 
а также при покупке земли компании X и Z пользовались преимуществами своего 
большого размера. В случае холдинга X рассредоточение растениеводческого про-
изводства в разных регионах страны снизило риск полной потери урожая из-за не-
благоприятных погодных условий, а компания Z благодаря своему размеру смогла 
оправдать расходы на создание экспериментальной лаборатории, работающей над 
проблемой повышения урожайности. 
С другой стороны, управление полевыми работами и работниками стало имен-
но той областью, в которой агрохолдинги X и Z вместо экономии на масштабе произ-
водства несли существенные потери. Обе компании продолжали пользоваться систе-
мой нормирования труда, унаследованной с советских времен. Однако со времени 
нашего полевого исследования они внедрили геоинформационную систему (ГИС) 
с целью улучшения логистики и облегчения контроля над работниками. Технологи-
ческие решения проблем управления, как и в целом модернизация производства, ве-
дут к дальнейшему сокращению занятости на сельскохозяйственных предприятиях 
и тем самым могут иметь важные последствия для сельских сообществ. 
Следует подчеркнуть, что и компания X, и компания Z несли убытки от недо-
статочной защищенности законом контрагентных отношений, недостатка квалифи-
цированных рабочих и управленческих кадров, а Z – также и от отсутствия вну-
треннего рынка предварительных продаж. Обе стремились минимизировать свою 
зависимость от других контрагентов на рынке: компания X полностью обеспечивала 
себя кормами и начала строительство комплекса по переработке молока, а холдинг 
Z подписал с международной пищевой компанией долговременные соглашения 
о снабжении сырьем и предпринял шаги с целью обеспечения самостоятельной 
транспортировки зерна на терминалы в портах на Черном и Балтийском морях. 
***
Подводя итоги, следует отметить, что преимуществами агрохолдингов X и Z яв-
ляются современные технологии производства и управления, а основными про-
блемами – противоречие между требованиями повышения рентабельности через 
модернизацию производственных и управленцеских процессов, с одной стороны, 
и социальным благополучием сельских сообществ, включая необходимость созда-
ния рабочих мест, с другой. Если говорить о будущем, то возможности этих ком-
паний связаны прежде всего с увеличением цены их активов, нереализованным 
потенциалом увеличения продуктивности и получением экономии от совмещения. 
С другой стороны, как у компании X, так и у компании Z есть «слабые места»: это 
низкая рентабельность в случае с Z и прибыль, находящаяся в прямой зависимо-
сти от государственных субсидий, в случае с X. При этом надо учитывать, что обе 
компании финансировали свое развитие за счет привлечения средств из-за рубежа 
и теперь несут обязательства по бондам, деноминированным в иностранной валю-
те, что делает их уязвимыми ввиду колебания курса рубля. 
Государственная политика существенно влияет на результаты деятельности 
этих компаний: изменение государственной поддержки сельскохозяйственно-
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го сектора в связи с вступлением России в ВТО напрямую коснется холдинга X; 
в свою очередь, эмбарго и тарифы на экспорт из-за использования Z экспортных 
рынков создают большие проблемы именно для этого холдинга, однако не касают-
ся холдинга X, ориентированного на внутренний рынок.
Развитие в России агрохолдингов объясняется в первую очередь тем, что преиму-
щества большого размера и экономия от совмещения компенсируют дезэкономию на 
масштабах производства. Дальнейшие реформы законодательной сферы, усовершен-
ствование институтов, регулирующих рынки, и улучшение инфраструктуры долж-
ны привести к снижению экономии от совмещения. Однако наиболее существенные 
трудности связаны с управлением работниками и взаимоотношениями с сельскими 
сообществами. Помогут ли агрохолдинги разрешить хронические социальные про-
блемы села или эти проблемы окажутся их ахилесовой пятой? Время покажет.
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